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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHICS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF DOMINION IN GENESIS 1:26-28

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Apart from Jesus' use of the Genesis creation story to establish ethical standards for marriage (Matt 19:3-9; Mark 10:2-12), and apart from Ellen White's osteal ethics of marriage equality,¹ there seems to be very little effort to ground ethics in Genesis 1-2. This may be due to the increasing belief in the mythical nature of Genesis 1-2.² It may also be due to the almost nonexistent role of the OT in the theological structure of many theologians or churches.³ We are thus confronted with the problem of whether Genesis 1-2 can be used to ground ethics and the problem of how one's interpretation of Genesis 1-2 affects the resulting ethics.

The purpose of this article is to critically survey the use of Genesis 1-2 as a ground of ethics. In particular, we will focus on the issue of human dominion over nature. A survey of *positions* on the ethics of dominion (as published in some Presbyterian sources) will provide the focus for our study. Likewise, the response of a Jesuit scholar to these published statements will be used to aid a brief, critical, and exegetical evaluation of these viewpoints.

Little has been done to establish a meaningful connection between Genesis 1-2 and ethics. It appears to be a virgin field. Apart from the Presbyterian/Jesuit exchange just mentioned, there is almost nothing in this area of study. With the role that the doctrine

of Creation plays in Adventist theology, the relationship between creation and ethics should be a topic of great interest.

In this article, *continuing creation* will refer to the view that creation is a continuous process (somewhat evolutionary in appearance) in which the work of creation is turned over to man through the gift of technology.⁴ *Evolution*, will refer primarily to the Darwinian concept. *Eugenics* refers to attempts to genetically improve humanity through various means of procreative control.⁵ Our study will be limited to exploring the Presbyterian position, the Jesuit scholar's response, and to a critical analysis.

Special thanks are given to the Lake Michigan Presbytery in Kalamazoo, Michigan for its help in identifying the publication containing the Presbyterian documents central to this discussion. The Presbytery specifically requested that it be made clear that the positions of these documents (approximately a decade old) are no longer held. A more moderate position has since been adopted.⁶ It is not my purpose to cast the Presbyterians in a negative light. Their work is simply the most convenient means of presenting a particular position. It is not the source or proponents which is of interest for this study, but the position itself as found in these historical records.

"Let Them Have Dominion": Ethics of Dominion and Survival

Social Statements of the Presbyterian Church. In 1983 the Presbyterian Church held its 95th General Assembly. Part of the outcome of this assembly was the production of two social statements, "The Covenant of Life and the Caring Community" (hereafter referred to as "Covenant of Life"), and "Covenant and Creation: Theological Reflections on Contraception and Abortion" (hereafter referred to as "Covenant and Creation"). Both documents were published in the minutes of the assembly in consecutive order (with "Covenant of Life" being first), and with a common introduction.⁷

The development of the "Covenant of Life" and "Covenant statements was the result of a four year effort by the Advisory Council on Church and Society, an internal committee of the General Assembly. In 1979, the 191st General Assembly requested this council to study the implications of genetic research and

human engineering. The Advisory Council in turn, appointed a task force that produced a significant "resource issue of *Church and Society* magazine [a Presbyterian publication] entitled 'Genetics, Health, and Personhood' (Sept.-Oct. 1982)."⁸

This work of the Advisory Council, culminating in the magazine publication, forms the essential foundation for both the "Covenant of Life" and "Covenant and Creation" statements. "Covenant of Life," being the first report, is the more significant of the two when viewed in light of the purpose of this article. It sets the theological tempo for both documents.

Covenant of Life: Continuing Creation. "God is the God of history and historical events are vehicles for divine revelation," the opening words tell us.⁹ This statement may well be true. God may certainly make use of historical events to reveal His will or Himself to us. However, it seems that this statement could mean something different than this simple truth. It could also be construed to mean that the flow of history, such as in technological development, is automatically considered to be a divine revelation. Then we end up with the potential for new, "historical" revelations to impact our view of Scriptural revelation instead of Scripture affecting our understanding of historical events.

Taken far enough, this belief could lead to radical reinterpretations of Scripture in the light of our "historical events," for example, our scientific advancements, etc. The question comes, "How do the authors of this document understand this opening statement?" The key to answering this question is found in certain statements regarding the role of humanity in the creative processes.

Options for human choice-making at the beginning of life are many, offering persons the opportunity to be *co-laborers with God* in the development of their families. . . . While abortion may be a morally responsible choice *and must remain available*, it cannot become ordinary.¹⁰

Abortion seems implied as a means of co-laboring with God in the development of one's family. On the other hand, there are balancing statements warning of the potential for "abuse and dehumanization" as well as an admonition not to allow genetic research to turn into a form of idolatry in the search for the "perfect man."¹¹ Nevertheless, both genetic research and abortion are im-

plied to be viable methods in human collaboration with God in the development of the family. Thus eugenics seems possible as a means of collaboration with the divine. These views would seem to indicate that the creators of this document have a more radical understanding of historical events as vehicles of divine revelation. The clincher now appears:

As Presbyterians, we welcome the challenges that cause us to reexamine the boundaries and descriptions of our faith. *Scientific research has revealed* to us that *creation is not fixed, but ongoing*; God calls us to be involved in the process. We behold God as the initiator and director of the process of continuing creation. Old securities are now gone; new insecurities appear; hope and faith remain.

These recommendations are a *call to venture forth with God* out of the already into the not yet.¹²

Notice that the verbal form of "revelation" is used of science. This clearly ties into the opening statement that historical events are vehicles for divine revelation. Thus we find here the affirmation that scientific research is part of revelation, for scientific research is said to "reveal." What does it reveal? It reveals that creation is not fixed, or finished as Genesis 1 says, but rather is an ongoing (and assumably progressing) process, a process that God calls us to participate in. It is a process that God initiates and directs but with which humanity is intimately involved.

As part of this process, this document (as well as "Covenant and Creation") gives strong support to genetic research and counseling, and sees abortion as a justifiable option in light of genetic counseling (for example, one can—and maybe should—abort a genetically defective fetus to prevent suffering for the fetus-turned-child and the family).¹³ Therefore, genetic technology, abortion, and the possibility of eugenics are implicitly included as legitimate aspects of continuing creation.

In short, we are on the borders of theological justification for eugenic-like activities. "Scientific undertakings are imbued with moral and ethical values and are central to living under the Word of God in contemporary society."¹⁴

Ethics of Dominion. In "Covenant and Life," the concept of continuing creation is augmented with a very subtle dose of the concept of dominion over nature. There is one major section head-

ing entitled, "Genetic Choices and the Ethics of Dominion."¹⁵ This title apparently is an allusion to Genesis 1:26, 28, but not necessarily so. When one views creation as an ongoing process, the immediate supervision of which has been delegated to man by God, one naturally would tend to have a very high view of that dominion. (Ironically, this high view of dominion would seem to depict God as an absentee landlord, which in turn adds weight to the concept of human dominion, and an endless, increasing cycle is born.)

It is in the name of exercising dominion that genetic research on the fetus is encouraged, and abortion of genetically "defective" fetuses is considered. In the name of dominion and continuing creation, research and development in science is to be guided by the following human values: "survival, enhancement of life [that is, quality of life], justice and equity of access [to the various technologies]."¹⁶ The ethics of dominion have produced an ethics of survival and life quality, an inherently consequentialist form of ethics.¹⁷ That which enhances life quality and survival is good. Good is determined by results alone.

Covenant and Creation. This document follows immediately on the heels of "Covenant of Life" and draws on the themes of continuing creation and dominion. Man's responsibility to care for God's world, the care for creation, and the stewardship of life are all prominently emphasized. Contraception, abortion, and genetic technology are all related to the exercise of this care over creation. In what seems to be a magnificent oxymoron, abortion is considered to be an aspect of the stewardship of life! The statement continues:

Abortion can therefore be considered a responsible choice within a Christian ethical framework when serious genetic problems arise or when resources are not adequate to care for the child appropriately. Elective abortion, when responsibly used, is intervention in the process of pregnancy precisely because of the seriousness with which one regards the covenantal responsibility of parenting.¹⁸

Again we notice the line of reasoning that man's position in continuing creation and his position of dominion justifies termination of pregnancies. This dominion over pregnancy is to be utilized to terminate the genetically inferior or the economically inconvenient. The high view of dominion, and the virtual autonomy of man from God in exercising it can be further seen in the assertion

that while some of these types of decisions are difficult, and there are no easy answers, we are assured by the gospel of God's forgiveness, even if we misuse our freedom.¹⁹ As long as the intent is good, we can presume on the forgiveness of God. This is an extremely high view of human dominion. It seems to forget the famous saying that, "Absolute power corrupts absolutely."

These views of continuing creation and dominion are the final result of a theological process initiated earlier as we have seen. To bolster this position, so as not to create a straw man, we will now go back to the three consecutive articles in the magazine *Church and Society* which provide more detailed support for this view of human dominion and further draw out the ethical implications of continuing creation and dominion. We will also see that survival of the "species" is a strong motivating ethical factor.

Church and Society Articles

The Optimistic View: Part One. In "Ethical Options in the New Genetics," Peter Browning depicts three positions or reactions to the potential uses of genetic technologies:²⁰ the "Optimistic," the "Pessimistic," and the "Moderate."²¹ The optimistic view encourages continued development of genetic technologies, for it has great faith in the ability of human beings to use technology wisely. Joseph Fletcher is cited as a "spokesman for this view." Browning cites Fletcher as supporting this optimism on two grounds:

First, that humans are rational and free creatures who may use their power to control nature, and second, that genetic intervention is morally justified because it produces the "greatest good" for society.²²

Browning connects the first principle in this Fletcherian concept of control with Genesis 1:28 and asserts, with Fletcher (who makes no reference to Scripture in the materials I read), that man is "obliged" to exercise his rational choice and to no longer submissively trust the random workings of nature in human reproduction and genetics. "This attempt to influence heredity [through genetic technology] is not a foolish desire to 'play God,' but a rational exercise of *dominion over creation*."²³

At this point, Browning moves from the dominion argument to the consequentialist argument of what produces the greatest

good for society. For this reason, we will turn to the second of the three articles, for the further development of the dominionist position, based on Genesis 1-2.

In his article "Bio-Ethics: A Theological Frontier,"²⁴ Carl G. Howie also cites Genesis 1:28 to establish man's dominion over creation. Man is to subdue and dominate the earth and its creatures. Howie couples the passage with Genesis 2:15 which notes that God put man in the garden to till and keep it. Howie interprets this second passage to mean that God gave humans "the role of maintaining and changing the habitat."²⁵ Howie continues in this line of reasoning, asserting that interference with or reshaping creation is not forbidden. In fact, he sees the Genesis texts as calling humanity to "use the raw material of nature and of life to make creation better. . . to alter creation by intervention."²⁶

Howie observes that some object to this position, asserting that creation was completed in a specified span of time according to Genesis [2:1,ff.] and that it was called good and complete. Howie responds by stating that the more pervasive biblical theme is one of creation as a continuous process. He notes the description of God creating new heavens and a new earth (an apparent allusion to Isaiah 65:17). John 5:17b ("My Father is working still, and I am working," RSV) is quoted as evidence. The book of Revelation as a whole is cited, and Paul's comments about the creation being in turmoil (Rom 8) are mentioned on the grounds that this kind of suffering and turmoil is not God's intent. Paul is interpreted as characterizing the turmoil as birth pangs for that which is not yet.²⁷

The *Imago Dei* is the next support given by Howie for human dominion. His reasoning gets a little foggy, but his major point is that our being in the image of God uniquely qualifies us to be "consciously involved in the creative process with God." What is this creative process directed toward? "Theologians like Leslie Dewart . . . insist that the human person is a self-creating person."²⁸ Thus, the image of God seems to be understood as the functional use of man's creative genius in cooperative creation with God, including the application of that ability towards the development of the human race.

This development must be wrought by decision making that finds its guidance both from abstract laws and principles as well as

by evaluating the consequences. The result is that Howie affirms the sacredness of life as a divine gift and not as an emanation from the divine. Thus innocent life must be protected. But on the other hand, issues of genetic engineering, therapeutic and selective abortion, and other issues, raise new questions about the sanctity of life for all religious people.²⁹ The concept of human dominion that makes man co-creator with God in the process of continuing creation leads to a stunning conclusion:

*The gene pool is our ultimate heritage, and we have a responsibility to keep and pass on this biological heritage, in better shape if possible, to succeeding generations. Far from being forbidden, to be involved in the realm of life would, at least for some, be seen as a duty. So life is extraordinary, a precious stewardship which we are to protect and to improve in quality, both for individuals and the common good.*³⁰

In the name of dominion, Howie and Browning have supplied a theological justification for a eugenical mentality. Man is to apply his genetic technology to manage the human gene pool as part of his dominion and stewardship. Browning's slant in this direction is not so readily apparent after only discussing the first principle of Fletcher, namely that man must exercise control over nature, justified by Genesis 1:28. We now return to Browning's article and continue with the second aspect of the optimistic response to genetic technology.

The Optimistic View: Part Two. Browning's depiction of the second principle of Fletcher's, that genetic intervention is morally justified because it produces the greatest good for society, will be quickly summarized, since it is simply an application of the dominionist ethic through a consequentialist approach. In short, the Fletcherian ethics would allow for the possibility of compulsory genetic screening of fetuses for genetic defects. "Therapeutic" abortion is affirmed as desirable when the fetus is diagnosed with a "serious" birth defect. This abortion is justified in that it is thought to produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people—which is exactly the definition of utilitarian ethics. A "quality of life" ethic replaces the "sanctity of life" ethic. Physical existence is not sacred in and of itself. Serious genetic abnormalities may require "cured" patients not to have children. Fletcher is depicted as not being beyond permitting some social control in human

reproduction for the "common good." Positive genetic programming is an option³¹ (known as positive eugenics).³² Fletcher is said to be unconvinced by skeptics who assert that humans are not wise enough to know which genetic traits to create.³³ My reading of Fletcher makes these allegations entirely believable.³⁴

The Pessimistic View. The mention of skeptics brings us to the pessimistic response to the capabilities of genetic technology. Paul Ramsey and Leon Kass are cited as representatives of this position.³⁵ Since the argumentation is not Genesis based, I shall only briefly summarize.

The essential foundation of the pessimistic response is the basic sinfulness and finitude of man, and the concern for "covenantal fidelity" to individuals (that is, individual life is sacred). The basic sinfulness and finitude of man is certainly implied in his fall as recorded in Genesis 3, and is implied by his creatureliness as well. Man by nature is not seen as trustworthy or wise enough to manage genetic technology. The negative consequences of genetic research are potentially worse than the "cure".

Finally, difficult questions arise over the probable sacrifice of semi-human, laboratory creations³⁶ in the experimentation process. The overall concern is that absolute dominion for man moves him from the position of creature into the divine role of Creator. Man thus ends up playing God.³⁷ In short, the pessimistic view is worried about what Browning calls the "slippery slope effect."³⁸

The fear is that acceptance of, for example, aborting fetuses with Downs Syndrome, could eventually lead to the abortion of fetuses for any unpleasant reason. As James Gustafson so artistically expressed the slippery slope sentiment in these words:

If one permits the camel's nose of the primacy of consequences to come under the tent of societies which protect inherent individual rights, does the whole frame and fabric of protection of the individual collapse?³⁹

The pessimists, then, have attempted to turn consequentialist ethics on its head with a consequentialist argument against consequentialism!

The Moderate View. The moderate response is simply an attempt to unite the optimistic and pessimistic responses. What is

significant is not so much this position but Browning's reporting of it.

Browning depicts this position in such a way that the pessimistic concerns all but disappear. Citing the work of Charles Curran, he employs eschatology as a model to clarify the tension between human freedom and sinfulness. Humanity is seen as having a limited, but active participation in bringing in the kingdom of God. This limited participation is said to "affirm technological progress."⁴⁰ Genetic intervention, therefore, becomes part of bringing in the kingdom of God! "Thus, while human beings should not try to create a genetic utopia, they can implement moderate controls over human heredity."⁴¹

This control is to be limited to the removal of defective traits, which is to say, limited to negative eugenics. We ultimately find this position closer to the Fletcherian model with only minimal effect from the pessimistic view. Browning, by this portrayal, clearly sides himself with the Fletcherian approach and its ethics of absolute dominion. We are left only one step from frightening implications of totalitarian control of the individual. How far can the ethics of dominion be taken? The third article of the trilogy under discussion will show us.

Evolution-Based Dominionist Ethics. "Genetics, Evolution, and Human Values" follows immediately after the articles by Browning and Howie.⁴² As Howie's article expanded the dominion concept of the optimist position in Browning's article, so Bentley Glass expands the second part of the optimist model, namely Fletcher's justification for genetic intervention.

Glass takes an explicitly evolutionary foundation for his ethics. Human values are derived from our biological nature and past evolution, says Glass, but transcend that nature and evolutionary history. The principle biological values are inherent in the evolutionary process, namely the adaptive nature of biological life (through natural selection). The adaptive features which are valuable in this evolutionary scheme are those features which "ensure the survival of the individual and the continuation of the species."⁴³ Thus sexual reproduction is of value for its wide variety of genetic recombinations, while a fixed life span is also of value for it "permits older individuals to survive only so long as they have themselves

[sic] the capacity to promote the survival and evolution of the species."⁴⁴ In short, we find an ethics of corporate survival that supersedes individual rights. Could this imply euthanasia (or abortion) for those deemed unable to promote the survival and evolution of the species?

Glass continues by addressing the issue of what humanness is, for to preserve the species, one must know what needs preserving. Man is unique because he evolved into a unique level of intelligence, cooperation, and emotion. These three characteristics have led to social evolution: first the family, then tribe, then nation, and probably a one world governmental order. For this process to work, the "old biological values" of survival and multiplication are inadequate and must be superseded by better values. "People cannot continue to exist except in a carefully ordered environment."⁴⁵ Glass then continues:

In the future, we may expect that genotypic diagnosis of the carrier state, and prenatal diagnosis of severely or fatally affected homozygotes of genetic disease will make it possible to *avoid the marriage of carriers of the same harmful genes, or at least to avoid their reproduction, or by means of selective abortion or prenatal treatment* to avoid births of severely or fatally handicapped babies.

In the past, the primary human right in the area of reproduction . . . has been the right of every person to produce offspring. This right need not be curtailed, *provided* every person is sufficiently informed and *willing* to avoid producing severely handicapped children. . . . In the future, *a higher right must prevail: the right of every child to be born with the assurance of genes entitling him or her to adequate health and intelligence.*⁴⁶

Although he rejects compulsory participation in such a program, Glass leans toward promoting a "voluntary" participation. While declaring the foundations of Nazi eugenics to be faulty (that is, we all have defective genes), Glass clearly propounds negative eugenics and leaves too many subjective doors open that could make eugenics compulsory. In fact, what he has done is to base human dominion on evolutionary values.

Humanity is seen as the apex of evolution and the only earthly entity capable of managing the genetic pool. As such, this evolutionary based dominion is functionally as absolute as the dominion

argued from Genesis 1-2. Proponents of this evolutionary dominion fear the dangers of a deteriorating gene pool and see the need to control the evolutionary process!⁴⁷ This raises important questions.

For example, who will determine the order of the carefully ordered environment needed for human survival? Who will determine which conditions are handicaps or undesirable? How can "voluntary" be kept truly "voluntary"?

Negative eugenics was practiced in the United States in the early part of this century.⁴⁸ Between 1907 and 1938, sterilization laws were passed in thirty states, and the "voluntary" participation promoted by these laws tended to become forced. For example, it was a simple matter of withholding a welfare check from an unmarried mother until she "voluntarily" agreed to participation. This usually took only a day or two.⁴⁹ The people control implications are staggering! When evolutionary values of survival and genetic maintenance determine one's ethical values, almost anything becomes possible. For example, could it be possible to justify behavior such as infanticide in an evolutionary based ethics?

Evolution and Infanticide

Infanticide as Adaptive Behavior. Until recently, most people would have considered infanticide an extremely repugnant, abnormal behavior. But within the last twenty years, a few evolutionary scientists have proposed that infanticide may simply be an "adaptive" behavior inherited from our evolutionary development. Thus infanticide would fall in the normal instead of abnormal classification of behavior.⁵⁰ Several possible evolutionary explanations are given.

First, through the study of monkeys, Hrdy proposes that infanticide is a means of dominant males to eliminate competing genes and to establish their own genes by siring the most offspring. Thus both personal selfishness and the potential benefit to the species of these dominant genes become validators of infanticidal behavior.⁵¹

Second, female competition is suggested as a possible cause of infanticide by Duncan Anderson, among others. Females monkeys (and other animals) are thought to commit infanticide on the babies

of other's to make room for their own. Or, a female may kill her own baby to come into heat faster for the new dominant male (the theory being she fears losing social status with the male).⁵²

What we end up with is an evolutionary ethic of competition for mates and resources. This ethic is applied to human infanticide. Barbara Burke argues that human infanticide is too widespread in history and geography to explain it on the basis of pathology and aberrant culture. She cites Darwin as noting that infanticide is probably the most important of all population checks. Over one hundred primitive societies practice infanticide.⁵³ Four justifications are listed by Burke, three coming from the cultures that practice infanticide.

Justifications for Infanticide. The first justification is that the new baby will put too great a strain on the family resources. One application of this is to kill the second twin. Second, birth spacing is justification for infanticide. This usually relates to the matter of convenience, for this argument is most often found in nomadic cultures where the strain of multiple small children on a mother would be very great. The third reason given is that the child is born with the wrong gender, namely female. This is a narrow type of the "defective child" argument. Hrdy notes that for one third of the cultures surveyed, the first justification of infanticide was the elimination of infants considered defective.⁵⁴ Burke adds a fourth justification for infanticide in *these primitive cultures*, namely that neither effective contraception nor safe abortion are available in those cultures; therefore, infanticide is the safer alternative.⁵⁵

Notice the similarity of reasoning between the "primitive" justifications for infanticide and the "modern" justifications for abortion. In fact, they are essentially identical. Elimination of defective children, gender selection, convenience (including birth spacing), and strained resources (affordability) are all common justifications for abortion. Furthermore, some primitive cultures do not consider the newborn to be human until a recognition procedure or ceremony is performed. Consequently, infanticide is not considered murder.⁵⁶ Note the similarity to the argument that the fetus is not human and that abortion is, therefore, not murder. The shocking thing is that we find evolutionary justification of infanticide as normal, adaptive behavior for survival.

Evolution's Moral Implications

It seems evident from the preceeding discussion, as well as the Presbyterian data, that evolutionary viewpoints regarding human origins are accompanied by serious moral and ethical implications. James Rachels, an avowed Darwinist, clearly shows how Darwinian evolution undermines the two classic justifications of the special status of man: (1) That man is different from animals because he exists in the image of God, and (2) that man is different from animals because he possesses reason. By destroying these two distinctions, man no longer is special. He can no longer be treated on a different standard from animals. Humans are different only in degree, not in kind. Thus, ethics are to be determined by the individual's characteristics and the situation, not by the "species" of the creature.⁵⁷

This means that damaged humans could be sacrificed for the welfare of non-humans, especially the higher mammals.⁵⁸ In my estimation this could also mean the sacrifice of damaged humans for the welfare of undamaged humans as well. The sanctity of life, and particularly human life, is destroyed. The Ethics of Dominion, whether based on Genesis and continuing creation or on evolution, appear to be but a stepping stone to an explicit evolutionary ethic, a transition point between traditional Christian ethics and far more radical ethical viewpoints. But not everyone accepts these developments. Let us now turn our attention to critiquing dominionist ethics.

A Critique of Dominionist Ethics

We have looked at one corporate attempt to address some of the challenges presented by the explosion of human technological abilities. Addressing these issues to the point of taking positions is an extremely difficult task, in part, because of the current rapidity of human technological development. How are we to address this explosion of abilities and the issues it brings? Carl Howie has aptly noted that responses vary between groups.

Jews have usually depended on the Torah and tradition to guide them in such matters. Conservative Christians have tended to depend on a literal use of the Bible as the basis for knowing how to act and what to do. Liberal Protestants have ordinarily sought to respond

creatively and freely within the real life situation as it arises. Roman Catholics traditionally have held that what is natural is God-given and thus good and that there should be no interference with the natural.⁵⁹

It is my contention that the positions we have examined have been forged in the liberal Protestant mode. By contrast, we will be critiquing these positions from an essentially conservative approach. We will start with a brief look at the issue of continuing creation, then focus most of our attention on the issue of dominion, making use of a reaction article written by a Jesuit scholar in response to "Covenant of Life" and "Covenant and Creation." A few general analyses will conclude our remarks. This analysis is in no way exhaustive. Whole studies could be written on any one of these aspects. We will simply introduce possible avenues of understanding which could be developed in future research.

Continuing Creation Critiqued. The assertion is made that while Genesis 1-2 does teach a finished creation, the rest of the Bible depicts a process of continuing creation. In particular, references to God's creating a new heavens and new earth are cited (Isa 65:17; Rev 21-22), as well as John 5:17b, "My father is working . . .".

It seems grossly unfair to me to pit the Bible against itself. Without a belief in the unity of Scripture, this would be a natural method to employ. But in this instance a Protestant denomination proceeds to undermine a major pillar of Reformation and Protestant theology, namely the unity of Scripture. This tactic is simply a variation of the evolutionists' procedure to challenge the reliability of Scripture by raising the issue of internal contradictions. Pitting the Bible against itself in order to support continuing creation weakens the basic sense of trustworthiness needed to maintain the normative role of Scripture.

Second, the continuing creation position has confused *restoration* with ongoing creation. The Fall and resulting degeneration of man and the world are not taken into account. Isaiah 65:17 is part of an eschatological passage which closes with the depiction of the lion and lamb living peaceably together. Revelation 21-22 depicts a new order suddenly imposed, no sickness, dying, etc. The context is clear that these are restorations of a marred creation, not the apex of an ongoing creation.

The Bible opens with a perfect, deathless, sinless world. Later, this perfect situation was marred by sin and judgment. The ground was cursed. It was no longer the same world. Man degenerated so badly that the judgment of the Flood was imposed to restrain the course of sin. In Jesus, the first fruits of the restored kingdom are experienced. His miraculous healings attested to this fact. We finally close out the Bible with Eden restored. The tree of life reappears and all is perfect again. This is a redemption and restoration motif, not a creation motif. This same motif is operating in Romans 8:18-25 (especially vs. 21). However, it should be noted that the NT connects *the creative power of God with redemption and restoration*,⁶⁰ and not with an ongoing creation through human agents.

The same confusion is applied in the document to John 5:17b. The context is the healing of the sick man by the pool of Bethesda who had been an invalid for thirty eight years. Whether the man was born an invalid, or more likely became an invalid by disease or injury, doesn't matter. The healing of this man was not a case of ongoing creation from lower to higher, but was the restoration of a lost wholeness.

Because this healing occurred on the Sabbath, Jesus was persecuted. His response? "My father is working still and I am working." But what kind of work is Jesus referring to? The context demands that it be the work of restoring something lost, not the creation of something new. Once this confusion is cleared up, the concept of continuing creation becomes highly untenable.

Dominion Limited to Vassalship. The kingpin of the ethics of dominion which we have reviewed is the position that man's dominion is virtually absolute with little or no limitations. In response William Kurtz, a Jesuit scholar, has zeroed in on the issue of dominion as one going for the jugular vein. Kurtz has written an insightful article on the theology of dominion in Genesis 1:26-28, critiquing both "Covenant of Life" and "Covenant and Creation."⁶¹ Kurtz's work is significant in that very few commentators give significant attention to the issue of dominion. We will draw on his observations in our analysis of the issue of dominion.

There is no doubt that the language of Genesis 1:26-28 includes a divine commission for man to rule and subject the natural

world. But as Kurtz has rightly asked, "Are there limits to this rule?"⁶² He answers his own question, "Humans are to rule as God's image and representative, according to God's will, as stewards and not absolute masters, with respect for the creation they rule."⁶³ This comment is reminiscent of Brueggemann's statement that man was to live in God's world, with God's creatures, on God's terms.⁶⁴ Kurtz continues:

The very context of the commission [to subdue the earth] puts limits on human dominion. The fact that this dominion is a gift from God to humans He has created imposes the implied limits of God's will on human dominion. These implied limits are further underscored in Gen [sic] 1:29-30, where God gives humans only vegetable life for food, not animal life (that comes only after the flood in Genesis 9).⁶⁵

Kurtz has rightly observed that man was restricted in dominion with regard to diet. A very specific diet was prescribed, namely, things that could be picked, thus not killing even the plants. As Gerhard von Rad has observed, there was to be, "No shedding of blood within the animal kingdom, and no murderous action by man! This word of God, therefore, *means a significant limitation in the human right of dominion.*"⁶⁶

Kurtz notes a second evidence of limitation related to diet, namely the restriction from eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Human freedom is expressly limited by a prohibition under penalty of death. The serpent's temptation was designed to entice Eve to reject the gap between Creator and creature by extending her dominion beyond the prescribed limits.⁶⁷

In my estimation this tree also illustrates stewardship. The restriction implies God's ownership of the garden. It is His garden, not Adam and Eve's. An analogy can be drawn with human ownership. I tell visiting children that they are free to play all over my back yard *except* in the raspberry patch and vegetable garden. I can reserve those portions because I am the legal owner/resident (on the human level). The right to reserve something for oneself comes with ownership. No further reason is needed. Human dominion, therefore, cannot be a dominion akin to the dominion of ownership.

In this vein of thought it is interesting to note that the language of dominion and rulership regarding man is royal lan-

guage. Man was created to rule.⁶⁸ This rulership was to be compassionate, not exploitive. "Even in the garden, he who would be lord of all must be servant of all."⁶⁹ Brueggemann also recognizes this rulership was for care-giving, not exploitation.⁷⁰

The royal aspect of this commission would suggest that the corporeal totality of mankind was to act as a vassal for God. Thus, as Davidson has noted, human dominion is delegated, and because it is delegated, man is responsible, that is, accountable, to God.⁷¹ As we all know, no vassal rules autonomously, but rather according to the suzerain's policies.

Dominion Partially Lost By Man's Fall. Another issue that seems virtually undealt with is whether the dominion of Genesis 1:26 was partially or fully lost with the Fall. Kidner notes James 3:7-8 as evidence for a limitation of dominion caused by sin.⁷² Indeed, in Genesis 3:17ff., man loses dominion over the ground. The cultivation of crops will be more difficult. Man is often victimized by animals, weather, etc. We can't control everything. John Muir, the pioneer environmentalist, in rebutting the view that man has total control over animals without ethical qualm, satirically characterizes man's lack of dominion. With his typical, sharp-witted flair Muir wrote:

The world, we are told was made especially for man—a presumption not supported by all the facts. A numerous class of men are painfully astonished whenever they find anything, living or dead, in all God's universe, which they cannot eat or render in some way what they call useful to themselves. They have precise dogmatic insight into the intentions of the Creator, and it is hardly possible to be guilty of irreverence in speaking of *their* God any more than of heathen idols. He is regarded as a civilized, law-abiding gentleman in favor of either a republican form of government or of a limited monarchy; believes in the literature and language of England; is a warm supporter of the English constitution and Sunday schools and missionary societies; and is as purely a manufactured article as any puppet at a half-penny theater.

With such views of the Creator it is, of course, not surprising that erroneous views should be entertained of the creation. To such properly trimmed people, the sheep, for example, is an easy problem—food and clothing "for us," eating grass and daisies white by divine appointment for this predestined purpose, on perceiving the demand for

wool that would be occasioned by the eating of the apple in the Garden of Eden.

In the same pleasant plan, whales are storehouses of oil for us, to help out the stars in lighting our dark ways until the discovery of the Pennsylvania oil wells. Among plants, hemp, to say nothing of the cereals, is a case of evident destination for ship's rigging, wrapping packages, and hanging the wicked. Cotton is just another plain case of clothing. Iron was made for hammers and ploughs, and lead for bullets; all intended for us. And so of other small handfuls of insignificant things.

But if we should ask these profound expositors of God's intentions, How about those man-eating animals—lions, tigers, alligators—which smack their lips over raw man? Or how about those myriads of noxious insects that destroy labor and drink his blood? Doubtless man was intended for food and drink for all these? Oh, no! Not at all! These are unresolvable difficulties connected with Eden's apple and the Devil. *Why does water drown its lord? Why do so many minerals poison him? Why are so many plants and fishes deadly enemies? Why is the lord of creation subjected to the same laws of life as his subjects?* Oh, all these things are satanic, or in some way connected with the first garden. . . .

. . . When an animal from a tropical climate is taken to higher latitudes, it may perish of cold, and we say that such an animal was never intended for so severe a climate. But when man betakes himself to sickly parts of the tropics and perishes, he cannot see that he was never intended for such deadly climates. No, he will rather accuse the first mother of the cause of the difficulty . . . or [he] will consider it a providential chastisement for some self-invented form of sin.⁷³

Muir here puts an exclamation point on the fact that man does not currently possess the power he was given at creation. Man has partial dominion but not the fullness of the creation dominion. In the light of human nature, as expressed in Genesis six, it is probably just as well that we don't have the fullness of that dominion. But what was that original dominion like?

It seems to me that we cannot be dogmatically sure of what the unfallen dominion was like, but I believe Scripture gives us a clue. Romans 5:12-21 depicts Christ as the new Adam. Reading the new Adam motif into the Gospels, one sees Christ as the new Adam, exercising dominion over fish (filling fishing nets, retrieving a coin),

demons and swine, an unbroken colt, storms, trees (the fig that withered), and the properties of water (he walked on it and turned it to wine). It would appear that Christ modeled Adam's dominion over nature as part of His life revelation. This kind of dominion is unknown to us. We find, therefore, that while technology gives us greater dominion over nature, it still is far short of the original. Thus, it seems a bit dubious to take dominion as seriously as the Presbyterian statements have taken it.

Dominion Over Other Humans Not Intended. Even if man had been given unlimited dominion, that dominion is clearly stated to only be over nature. The wording of Genesis 1:26 indicates that "man," as male and female entities, was to have dominion over nature. Male was not given dominion over female or vice versa. The text does not depict some humans having dominion over other humans, but portrays all humans as being given dominion over nature. In the blessing of verse twenty eight, the forthcoming generations of humanity are included in having dominion over nature. Clearly, then, this dominion is not applicable to intra-human relationships.

This portrayal of dominion in the biblical text closes a Pandora's box of issues involving whether the zygote or fetus constitutes a human being. If either is a human entity, then, from an exegetical reading of Genesis 1:26,28, our dominion over nature does not extend over them, and the primary justification for genetic tampering with, and research on the fetus is undermined. Fetal life could not be considered part of the human dominion over nature under these circumstances.

Furthermore, it is of vital importance to note that human power over nature through technology is intimately related to human power over humans. C.S. Lewis has aptly noted that "what we call Man's power over nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as its instrument."⁷⁴ Any or all of the things in nature that man claims power over,

... can be withheld from some men by other men—by those who sell, or those who allow the sale, or those who own the sources of production, or those who make the goods. What we call man's power is, in reality, a power possessed by some men which they may, or may not, allow other men to profit by.⁷⁵

Lewis then applies this thinking to the issue of man exercising that power over his offspring. Until now, man has lived exercising power over his predecessors by changing traditions, etc. If one generation can attain by eugenics, the power to make its descendants what it pleases, (which is very close to the negative eugenics supported by the Presbyterian social statements we examined), then all succeeding generations will be subjects of that power.⁷⁶ Lewis continues:

I am only making clear what Man's conquest of Nature really means and especially that final stage in the conquest which, perhaps, is not far off. The final stage is come [*sic*] when Man by eugenics, by pre-natal conditioning, and by education and propaganda based on a perfect applied psychology, has obtained full control over himself. *Human* nature will be the last part of Nature to surrender to Man. The battle will be won. We shall have taken the thread of life out of the hand of Clotho' [*sic*] and be henceforth free to make our species whatever we wish it to be. The battle will indeed be won. But who indeed will have won it?

For the power of Man to make himself what he pleases means, as we have seen, the power of some men to make other men what *they* please.⁷⁷

Lewis has cogently shown how human dominion and power over nature necessarily becomes the power of some men over other men. When, in the name of dominion and genetic purification, one argues that genetic intervention, abortion, and "voluntary" non-procreation are needed to preserve the human race, by necessity, involuntary people control must appear in that generation. For who but the experts could determine what is genetically best? Genetic "counseling" by necessity must become genetic salesmanship, or, more likely, genetic coercion.

This necessarily leads us to a society reminiscent of Plato's republic with its philosopher king whose expertise in "the good" was to determine private life and public policy.⁷⁸

In the name of species preservation, the individual becomes expendable for the common good, and a utilitarian ethic emerges. "Plato's entire conception of the *pólis* reveals a thoroughgoing subordination of the individual to the interests of the com-

munity."⁷⁹ I see no way to avoid a quasi-totalitarian rule of the experts.

We find, therefore, by two different means that the interpretation of dominion as expressed in the Presbyterian documents becomes untenable for it ends up placing man in dominion over man. Exegesis of Genesis 1:26-28 clearly excludes this form of dominion, and Lewis shows how dominion through technology cannot be universally held, since it places man in dominion over man. We now turn briefly to the issue of humanness.

Defining What Is Human

Because man is not to dominate his fellowman, the big question that must enter the ethical issues surrounding the zygote, fetus, and newborn is the question, "Are these human?" This issue is a very hot potato, and there is no way to address adequately this issue in the confines of this article.⁸⁰ However, a couple of points are noteworthy.

Early Christianity expressly condemned the practices of abortion and infanticide.⁸¹ A hotly debated issue was that of the ensoulment of the embryo/baby. Three major views were promoted. The *Transducian* view said the soul was generated with the body at conception. The *Pre-Existence* view was derived from Plato and asserted that the soul preexists conception and is joined to the body after conception. The *Creationist* view maintained that the soul is created *ex nihilo* by God and infused into the developing embryo, but the timing was debated.⁸²

Of interest to us is the fact that all three are dualistic and view the embryo/fetus as becoming human with ensoulment. The hot topic? When does ensoulment happen? When does the embryo become human? Thus an embryo or fetus could be non-human if not ensouled, and the door to fetal tampering is wide open again.

But what if one's theology rejects the dualist view of man?⁸³ Robert Dunn has fittingly observed that the difference between the unified view and dualist view must necessarily impact one's view of fetal humanness.⁸⁴ Dunn implies a unified view would favor seeing the zygote as human.⁸⁵ Certainly it mitigates against the idea of becoming human at some process oriented point. It would

seem that the unified view would require a human status at either conception or implantation in the uterus.⁸⁶

The wholistic view of man in Scripture would thus lend itself towards regarding the fetus (and possibly the zygote) as essentially human. Thus, the fetus would be excluded from the natural realm which humanity was to have dominion over, sharing dominion in *potentia*. This in turn raises serious questions regarding tampering with fetal life through our technology. While further exploration of these issues is possible and needed, we must briefly give some attention to the survival basis of ethics.

A Few Thoughts on Survivalist Ethics

We have seen that the more oriented toward evolution the authors of our study were, the more "survival of the species" oriented they were. This tended to produce a utilitarian view of the individual, namely, individual rights are expendable for the greater good of species survival. We will entertain two brief thoughts regarding the ethics of species survival.

First, when the "cause" to be maintained is species survival, "moral" right and wrong becomes defined by whether or not something contributes to the cause. This means that without another, superimposed ethic, any action that contributes to the survival of the human species is justifiable. Positive and negative eugenics, as well as infanticide, have all been defended on the survival of the species ground as we have seen.

A classic expression of this survivalist ethic was the statement by Caiaphas that it was better for one [innocent] man to die than to jeopardize the survival of the nation. (See John 11:47-50). The death of Jesus was plotted and justified on the basis of a survivalist ethic. An inconvenient, innocent man could be destroyed to preserve the status quo.

Second, maintaining species or personal existence does not seem to be the ultimate value in Scripture. It is an important value, but not the ultimate value. When Israel worshiped the golden calf (Exod 32:9,ff.), there was a dialogue between Moses and God. God said he would destroy Israel and make Moses a great nation. Moses responded by asking God how the pagan Egyptians would perceive

Him if Israel were destroyed. They would impute evil motives and an evil reputation to God. Moses asked God to repent of his decision.

After going to the people, Moses continued in dialogue with the Lord. He asked God to forgive Israel but if not, to "blot me out of thy book." (verse 32). Moses felt that God's reputation was more important than his own existence. He was more concerned that God honor his promise to Abraham than he was in his own survival or personal gain. He could not conceive of living where there is no faithful God. He could not bear to see God's name dishonored by the Egyptians.

Jesus addressed the issue of survivalism with an astounding paradox: "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it" (Mark 8:35). Christ's "sake" or benefit (or reputation) and the Gospel's benefit are of higher value than life.

The public relations aspect of God's character is of supreme value. His glory is the ultimate value. Thus Revelation describes those who gain victory over the devil and the beast as gaining that victory, in part, because they "loved not their lives unto the death." (Rev 12:11). These true believers found something of greater value than life itself. For Christians to engage in an ethic of survival is to seek to save one's life, and the paradox is, they will lose it.

Conclusions

What shall we conclude from our study? I see at least five main conclusions.

First, it seems clear that the concepts of continuing creation and absolute dominion are not supported by Scripture. Therefore, attempts to support continuing creation end up pitting the Bible against itself and undermining its reliability and normative quality.

Second, it seems clear that the positions taken in the Presbyterian documents, especially continuing creation, are founded on modern science and then read back into Scripture. When Science is viewed as revelation that interprets the Scriptures instead of *visa versa*, one elevates Science to a position of authority higher than Scripture. From a conservative position, this is very dangerous and not acceptable.

Third, views of creation and origins that deviate from the

literal reading of Genesis 1-2 do have moral implications and consequences, denials notwithstanding. Rachels and the infanticide data clearly demonstrated moral implications. Furthermore, the ethics of dominion were based in continuing creation. Clearly, alternative views of origins have moral and ethical implications.

Fourth, when consequentialism is the sole ethical system, as Glass and Fletcher suggest, and survival determines the moral value of the consequences, anything can be justified. Therefore, consequentialist ethics needs a supporting system of ethics in order to prevent abuses. An outside, absolute norm is needed.

Finally, we discovered that we can ground ethics in Genesis 1-2. Jesus did, Ellen White did, and we did. Our whole study that human dominion does not apply to man over man was based entirely on Genesis 1:26-28. However, much more can be done with ethics and Genesis 1-2.

I believe there is great potential insight into the ethics of marriage, sexuality, homosexuality, and environmental stewardship that can be found in these chapters. While defining humanness is debated, most interpretations assume a dualistic view of man. Seventh-day Adventists could do more to develop a definition of humanness, based in part on Genesis 1-2, which reflects the implications of the unified view. Out of the new insights, issues such as genetic intervention in the fetus could be more adequately addressed. Great things are yet to be done in regard to Genesis and ethics.

Endnotes

¹ Ellen G. White, *Patriarchs and Prophets* (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press Publishing Assoc., 1958), p. 46.

² See Gerhard Hasel, *Biblical Interpretation Today* (Washington, DC: Biblical Research Institute, 1985), pp. 7-50. Hasel overviews the major, modern critical approaches to the Old Testament and mentions the mythical view of Genesis 1-11 on page 38. See also Erickson's criticism of Langdon Gilkey in Milard J. Erickson, *Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 378-379.

³ William M. Landeen, *Martin Luther's Religious Thought* (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1971), 182-190. Landeen clearly outlines how Luther did not see Moses as normative for Christians, an attitude passed on to his followers. See also, David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 22-42. Tracy outlines four systems of theology beyond orthodoxy which illustrate varying degrees of revisionism regarding all or part of the Bible.

⁴ *Minutes: 195th General Assembly [of] The United Presbyterian Church in*

the *United States of America, 1983, Part 1, Journal* (publishing data unavailable), pp. 363-370. Hereafter referred to as *Minutes*.

5 Ted Howard and Jeremy Rifkin, *Who Should Play God?* (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1977), p. 48. "Eugenics is generally categorized into two types, negative and positive. Negative eugenics involves the systematic elimination of so-called biologically unfit types of people from the population. Positive eugenics is concerned with the increased breeding of the most 'fit' biologically sound types of persons in society."

6 There is a more recent document entitled "Problem Pregnancies and Abortions" which can be obtained for \$2.00 by calling 1-800-524-2612. Order number is: OGA-92-017.

7 *Minutes*, pp. 363-370.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 362.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 363.

10 *Ibid.*, Emphasis supplied.

11 *Ibid.*

12 *Ibid.* Emphasis supplied.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 364-366, 368.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 365.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 364.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 365-366.

17 See Joseph Fletcher, "New Beginnings in Life," *The New Genetics and the Future of Man*, ed. Michael P. Hamilton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), p. 81. Fletcher says, "Over against this approach is the consequentialist one, seen in utilitarianism, pragmatism and implicitly in the ethics of all biomedical research and development. Most of us reason inductively from the data of choice or option situations to decisions aimed at maximizing desirable consequences. We do not argue deductively from *a priori* or predetermined notions that whole classes of acts (such as *in vitro* fertilization or the sacrifice of test zygotes) are right or wrong to the conclusion that we ought or ought not to do anything that happens to fall in that class. For consequentialists, and I am thoroughly in their camp, what counts is results, and results are good when they contribute to human well-being."

18 *Minutes*, p. 368.

19 *Ibid.*

20 Peter Browning, "Ethical Options in the New Genetics," *Church and Society*, September/October 1982, pp. 52-61.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 52.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53. Emphasis Browning's. Browning is citing Joseph Fletcher, *The New Genetics and the Future of Man*. (Hereafter called *New Genetics*), p. 8 [sic]. The actual pages of this chapter are 78-89. The second point is clearly found on p. 78, but the first point is more clearly expressed in Joseph Fletcher, *The Ethics of Genetic Control* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 36-38. (Hereafter called *Ethics*.) Browning later quotes a phrase from p. 36.

23 Browning, p. 53. Emphasis supplied. Browning cites Fletcher, *Ethics*, p. 36, changing a rhetorical question of Fletcher's into a plain statement of opinion. However, the context of Fletcher supports Browning's alteration in my estimation.

24 Carl G. Howie, "Bio-Ethics: A Theological Frontier," *Church and Society*, September/October 1982, pp. 62-68.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 62.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 63.

27 *Ibid.*

28 *Ibid.*

29 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

30 *Ibid.* Emphasis Howie's.

31 Browning, pp. 53-55.

32 Howard and Rifkin, p. 48. "Eugenics is generally categorized into two types, negative and positive. Negative eugenics involves the systematic elimination of so-called biologically unfit types of people from the population. Positive eugenics is concerned with the increased breeding of the most 'fit' biologically sound types of persons in society."

33 Browning, p. 54.

34 See Fletcher, *New Genetics*, pp. 83-83, and *Ethics*, pp. 30-38.

35 Ramsey's position is taken primarily from: Paul Ramsey, *Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970). This book is a thoughtful and thorough criticism of eugenics, based on genetic technological capabilities.

36 Joseph Fletcher states: "There may be the need one day, in the human situation at large, for one or more people especially constituted genetically to survive long periods outside a bathysphere at great marine depths or outside space capsules at great heights. If the greatest good for the greatest number were served, it would be justifiable not only to specialize people by cloning or constructive genetic engineering but also to bio-engineer or bio-design para-humans or 'modified' men as chimeras (part animal) or cyborg androids (part prostheses)." *New Genetics*, p. 83.

37 Browning, pp. 55-57.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

39 James M. Gustafson, "Genetic Counseling and the Uses of Genetic Knowledge—An Ethical Overview," *Ethical Issues in Human Genetics*, eds. Bruce Hilton, et al. (New York: Plenum Press, 1973), p. 103.

40 Browning, p. 60.

41 *Ibid.*

42 Bentley Glass, "Genetics, Evolution, and Human Values," *Church and Society*, September/October 1982, pp. 68-78.

43 *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

44 *Ibid.*

45 *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 73. Emphasis supplied.

47 Browning, p. 55. What a fantastic admission of the failure of natural selection and evolution! The evolutionary process which is supposed to have produced a superior being called man, now needs man to control its processes. It is amazing how natural selection could produce artificial selection to preserve itself!

48 Howard and Rifkin, pp. 47-49.

49 Ian T. Taylor, *In the Minds of Men: Darwin and the New World Order* (Toronto: TFE Publishing, 1984), pp. 407-408. Taylor also reviews the eugenics and forced sterilization programs of Nazi Germany. The blind, deaf, and criminal came under these laws, for example. At one point, 450 people per day were sterilized. Positive eugenics was also practiced including "human stud farms."

Infanticide and euthanasia were adopted as part of this program. See pages 408-411.

50 Nancy Pearcey, "Why People Kill Babies," *Bible Science News* 30:6 (undated): 6-8. Pearcey writes a very accurate description of the infanticidal research while also giving an excellent analysis of implications. Pearcey also supplies an excellent starter bibliography for further research, a noteworthy exception to many works of conservative authors.

51 Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, "When the Bough Breaks," *The Sciences*, March/April 1984, pp. 45-50. This appears to be a landmark article for it is referenced by all the other authors I consulted on this subject.

52 Duncan Maxwell Anderson, "The Delicate Sex: How Females Threaten, Starve, and Abuse One Another," *Science* 86, April 1986, pp. 42-48. Anderson cites female competition for a reproductive partner as the underlying foundation of the cosmetic and fashion industries (p. 48). These products, he says, are designed to make a woman look younger and healthier than she is, "by giving her the big eyes, smooth skin, and ruddy cheeks and lips of a young girl. Makeup makes her look as if she has more potential years of childbearing ahead of her than she really has." Maybe there is more to the traditional Adventist call for simplicity in this matter than has been recognized up to this point.

53 Barbara Burke, "Infanticide," *Science* 84, May 1984, p. 29.

54 Ibid. See also, Hrdy, p. 49.

55 Burke, p. 30.

56 Hrdy, p. 50.

57 Rachels, pp. 171-172. This is Rachel's own summary of the first four chapters of his book. It gives the essential points without the detailed arguments.

58 Earl M. J. Aagaard, "Darwinian Morality?" *Origins* 18:2 (1991): 86-88. This article is a review of James Rachel's book, *Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism*, cited earlier. Aagaard reviews Rachel's work chapter by chapter and gives some insightful analyses in the process.

59 Howie, p. 65.

60 E. J. Waggoner, *Christ and His Righteousness* (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1890; facsimile reprint, Nashville, TN: Southern Publishing Association, 1972), pp. 31-38.

61 William Kurtz, "Genesis and Abortion: An Exegetical Test of a Biblical Warrant in Ethics," *Theological Studies* 47 (1986): 668-680. Pages 669-675 are devoted to an exegesis of Genesis 1:26-28, specifically the issues of dominion and the *Imago Dei*.

62 Ibid., p. 670.

63 Ibid.

64 Walter Brueggemann, *Genesis: A Commentary for Teaching and Preaching* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1982), 40. See also *Genetics, Ethics and Parenthood*, ed. Karen Lebacqz (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1983), 30-31 where human power and glory are argued to be derived from God and therefore limited. There are four contributing authors in this book but their work is not identified on an individual basis.

65 Kurtz, p. 670.

66 Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis: A Commentary* (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1961; revised, 1972) 61. Emphasis supplied.

67 Kurtz, p. 671.

68 Victor P. Hamilton, *Genesis (1-17)*, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 138.

69 Ibid.

70 Brueggemann, p. 32.

71 Robert Davidson, *Genesis (1-11)*, The Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 25.

72 Derek Kidner, *Genesis*, Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries (Chicago: Inter Varsity Press, 1967), p. 52.

73 John Muir, *The Wilderness World of John Muir*, ed. Edwin Way Teal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954), pp. 316-318. Second emphasis supplied.

74 C.S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 68-69.

75 Ibid., p. 68.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., p. 72.

78 See Donald Palmer, *Looking at Philosophy: The Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy Made Lighter* (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 71-74.

79 Julián Marias, *History of Philosophy*, trans. Stanley Applebaum and Clarence Strowbridge (New York: Dover Publications, 1967), p. 56.

80 An excellent little article that addresses the issue of humanness is Bruce K. Waltke, "Reflections from the Old Testament on Abortion," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 19 (1976): 3-13.

81 Carol A. Tauer, "The Tradition of Probabilism and the Moral Status of the Early Embryo," *Theological Studies* 45 (1984): 7-8. See also, John T. Noonan, "An Almost Absolute Value," *The Morality of Abortion*, ed. John T. Noonan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 7-12. This whole chapter is an excellent history of the abortion issue in the early through medieval church. See also, Elaine H. Pagels, *Adam, Eve, and the Serpent* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 81.

82 Tauer, pp. 7-8.

83 A belief in evolution would also affect one's view of humanness as has been seen in the work of Rachels. One conservative Christian asserts that Abortion itself is rooted in evolutionary thinking. The claim is that the aborted fetus is not considered human but a "tadpole larva," or perhaps an "early vertebrate larva." A later abortion may kill a "mammalian larva," etc. See, Paul A. Bartz, "Abortion Rooted in Evolutionary Scientific Fraud," *Bible Science News* 30:6 (undated): 1-2.

84 Robert H. Dunn, "Man and Soul in Genesis 2:7 - Ethical Considerations," (Term paper, Andrews University, 1987), pp. 8-9, Adventist Heritage Center.

85 Ibid.

86 If having an existential future is part of the *Imago Dei* (since God is depicted in Scripture as having one), then it could be said that the zygote has only a very limited existential future unless implanted in the uterus. In an ectopic pregnancy, the zygote/embryo has no real future. It will die with the mother, or die in the process of saving the mother. There is no way out alive. This could have implications on contraception, i.e., that prevention of uterine implantation is morally permissible if one considers humanness to occur at uterine implantation and not conception. However, this view opens a Pandora's box of ethical issues surrounding laboratory conceptions used for research.

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JUST SAY THE WORD

By Jay Gallimore

President, Michigan Conference

A Centurion's Faith

"But just say the word" (Matt 8:8, NIV). This ringing affirmation of faith addressed to Jesus didn't come from the Pharisees or Sadducees—not even from the lips of Peter, James, or John. They came from a Roman centurion, the imperial knife at the throat of Capernaum. Unlike Pilate, who seemed to hate the Jews, this centurion was attracted to the Jewish people and their religion. Normally the conqueror tries to force his "superior" religion on the conquered. This soldier was different, because he desired truth.

Living in Capernaum, he could not escape the reports of Jesus. The accounts of His miracles and teachings flooded the town and excited everyone. As the centurion put it all together, it became obvious to him who Jesus was.

Capernaum lay on the shores of the Sea of Galilee. Peter's home was situated there. Archaeologists believe that it was later enlarged to become one of the earliest Christian churches. The Romans who lived there also bought and sold slaves as they did all over the empire. Often they treated them with cruelty. Yet, again, this centurion seemed to be different. He treated his servant more like a son. He cared deeply for the young man.

In the course of events the servant came down with a terrible disease. We are not told what it was, but it must have been dreadful. The Scriptures say that he was "paralyzed and in terrible suffering" (Matt 8:6, NIV). The officer could only sit beside him and watch his servant's life ebb away. He knew his only hope was in Jesus. But how could he, an unclean Roman soldier, appeal to the Savior.